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In the Supre1t1e Court of the 
State of Utah 






DENVER AND RIO GRANDE WESTERN NO. 10,063 




BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries and property 
damage arising out of a collision between the Plaintiffs' 
pickup truck and Defendants', Denver and Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Company, train at a constructioo site 
maintained and controlled by Defendant, Weyher Con-
struction Company. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court, upon a motion fO!r summary judg-
ment made by borth Defendants and upon oral argument 
of the same, granted said motion with respect to Defend-
ant, Weyher Construction Company as to bort:h plaintiffs 
and further granted said motion with respect to Defend-
ant, Denver and Rio Grande Weste·rn Railroad Company, 
as to Plaintiff William H. Steele, and Plaintiffs appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs see·k reversal of the lower ·court's order 
granting motion for summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiffs are residents of Springville, Utah, and 
have been for .a great number of years. On the day of 
the accident, October 19, 1961, the Plaintiffs were on their 
way from their home in Springville to the Wildwood Nurs-
ery in Orem, Utah. The purpose of their trip being to 
pick up some shrubbery and flowers at the Wildwood Nurs-
ery and to return to Springville. In order for them to ar-
rive at their appointed destination, they traveled down 
Highway 91 to Provo, and from Provo down to what is 
commonly known as the Geneva Road, or Utah Highway 
No. 114. This highway travels west orf Provo in a north-
south direction. Mter traveling north on this highway 
for a distance of about three miles, they reached what 
would be 13th South, in O:rem, Utah, and they turned on 
thie:·road east and proceeded toward the Wildwood Nurs-
ery, which is located about one mile east of the Geneva 
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Road. As they proceeded east on 13th South, they ob-
served what appeared to them to be construction work 
taking place on the 13th South Road. As they drew nearer 
to the construction area, they saw a sign and barricade 
across 13th South, which informed them that the road was 
closed. At the western end of the construction area, the 
Plaintiffs could see what appeared to be a detour road 
which turned off to the south of the oiled portion of 13th 
South and along the southern edge of the construction 
area, which construction the Plaintiffs later determined 
to be an overpass over the railroad tracks of the Denver 
and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company. This gra-
veled road onto which Plaintiffs had turned, thinking it 
to be a detour around the construction area was construc-
ted in such a manner that a car traveling down the road 
could not see to the north and observe the approach of any 
trains which might be traveling south on the said railroad 
tracks. As the Plaintiffs proceeded down this graveled 
road, they were unaware of any impending danger and in 
fact the Plaintiff, William R. Steele, did not realize that 
there were railroad tracks lying in front of him. The first 
warning that Plaintiffs had that they were in any danger 
was at a point about ten feet from the railroad tracks when 
they heard a noise and looked up and saw the train about 
to strike their pickup. This warning came too late and 
the train collided with the pickup, knocking it down the 
tracks and totally demolishing the truck itself. Both the 
Plaintiffs suffered serious injury and were taken to the 
Utah Valley Hospital in Provo, Utah. 
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THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT NEITHER 
OF THE DEFENDANTS OWED A [)ilJTY TO THE 
PLAINTIFFS INSOFAR AS CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
BYPASS ROAD WAS CONCERNED. 
The record will disclose that the court in its pre-trial 
o~der forund that the Defendants owed no duty to the Plain-
tiffs with respect to construction of the bypass road. We 
respectfully submit that this was in error. 
As the Plaintiffs proceeded to drive up 13th South 
after turning east off from the the Geneva Road, they 
were confronted with an area which was under construc-
tion. The road on which they were traveling was barri-
caded off and marked "Road Closed". As the Plaintiffs 
neared the construction area and read the aborve sign, they 
observed a graveled road which turned off to the south 
of the construction area and then proceeded on east. This 
was a graveled road whieh was graded off in a level con-
dition and looked like one which was to be used as a de-
tour around the construction site. Subsequent investiga-
tion has shown that the road was not a detour, but that it 
was built for the use of both of the Defendants in con-
nection with the construction of the overpass over the rail-
road tracks; however, the mere fact that the road was a 
private one meant for the use of the Defendants in con-
nection with the construction project does not eliminate 
a duty towards the Pl<aintiffs. 
· - This graveled road was constructed in such a man-
ner and placed at such a point that it appeared to be a 
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detow- for traffic going east on 13th South, and the Plain--
tit1s llll~rely acted as reasonable people in assuming this 
lu be the case. By constructing this road in the manner 
in which they did and in placing it at this particular point, 
the Defendants had created a situation amounting to a 
hidden or dangerous trap for the unwary traveler. This 
seemed to be nothing more than a simple detour road, which 
was meant for the traveler's use in proceeding around the 
construction site. After starting down this road, the tra-
veler, as the Plaintiffs in this action found out, was un-
able to observe the conditions and traffic on the railroad 
tracks as to those trains proceeding south on said tracks. 
In fact a· clear view north could not be had until the Plain-
tiffs were almost upon the tracks. This situation ·existed 
because of the fill dirt that had been placed as a part of 
the overpass construction. 
Under these circumstances, we respectfully submit 
that the Defendants did have a duty to the Plaintiffs in-
sofar as construction of the road was concerned.. The 
duty which the Defendants had was that of an owner or 
occupant of the premises to a licensee or invitee to re-
frain from leading said licensee or invitee into hidden or 
dangerous traps and to give timely warning of such peril. 
The law of this state is clearly to this effect. 
Considering the Plaintiffs in the present case as in-
vitees, and we respectfully submit ·that they may be so 
considered, the Defendants were under a strict duty to 
refrain from leading them into dangerous traps and to 
refrain from exposing them to unreasonable risks; and if 
such exists, to give them timely nOtice and warning that 
such perils were present on the premises. The duty of 
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which we are speaking is set forth in 38 Am. Jur. 754,_ Sec-
tion 96 as foHorws: 
"The rule is that an owner oroccupant of land or buil-
dings who directly or impliedly invites others to enter 
for some purpose or interest or advantage to him owes 
to such person a duty to use ordinary care to have 
his premises in a reasonably safe condition for use in 
a manner consistent with the purpose of invitation, 
or at least not to lead them into a dangerous trap or 
to exp~e them to an unreasonable risk, but to give 
them adequate and timely notice and warning of lat-
ent or concealed peril which are known to him but 
nc,t. to them. Summarily stated to the extent of the 
invitation given, the property owner owes to an in-
vitee the duty of pre-vision, preparation and look-out'' . 
. (Emphasis added) 
It is important to note that the invitation need not 
be an express one, but may be made by implication as is 
noted from the above quotation, and as 38 Am. JUT. 758, 
Section 98 says: 
"A person may become an invitee to whom the owner 
of the premises is under a duty to maintain them in a 
safe condition when he is expressly invited to come 
upon the premises or when from the construction of 
buildings or use of the premises, such an invitation 
may be implied and invitation to enter may be implied 
from conduct of the owner or occupant, or of someone 
·else with his permission, which he knows, or reason-
ably should know, might ·give rise to the belief, in the 
mind cf a perso;11 ordinarily discerning, that the owner 
or . occupant intended such person to come upon the 
premises." (Emphasis added) 
· This· is ·the exact position that Plaintiffs are in in the 
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pr-esent ease. Because of the constluction area and the 
.. Road Closed" sign, they reasonably discerned that the 
road which proceeded to the south and around the con-
struction area was a detour road ·and was put there for 
the use of traffic proceeding east on 13th South. Under 
these circumstances, they clearly were invited to come 
upon these premises by both the Defendants. 
This Court in the case of Erickson v. Walgreen Drug 
Company, 120 Utah 31, 232 Pac. 2nd 210, has clearly set 
forth the duty which an owner or occupant of property 
owes to an invitee. In determining that duty, the Court 
quoted with approval from the Restatement of the Law 
of Torts, Section 343, as follows: 
"A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily 
harm caused to business visitors by a natural or arti-
ficial condition thereon if, but only if, he 
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care 
could discover the condition which, if known to him, 
he should realize as involving an unreasonable risk 
to them. and 
(b) Has no reason to believe that they will dis-
cover the condition or realize the risk involved there-
in, and 
(c) Invites or permits them to enter or remain 
upon the land without exercising reasonable care (i) 
to make the condition reasonably safe, or ( ii) to give 
a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the hann 
* * *". (Emphasis added) 
The section just quoted above applies to the circum-
stances of the present case. The Defendants had construc-
ted a road for use in servicing this construction work. By 
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so constructing that road, they had created an artificial 
condition which they knew or should have known by the 
exercise of reasonable care, was an unreasonable risk to 
the traveling public. 'Dhe Defendants, in addition, had no 
reason to suspect that the Plaintiffs or any orther traveler 
who happened upon that road would realize the risk in-
volved therein, and they further, by clear implication, in-
vited the Plaintiffs upon that road and permitted them to 
remain there without exercising reasonable care to make 
the condition safe or to give a warning adequate to enable 
the Plaintiffs to avoid harm. 
A case which we feel is of significance as related to 
the fact situation in the present case is Florez v. Groom 
Development Company, 348 Pac. 2nd 200. In that case, 
th.e Plaintiff was an employee of a s~b-contractor. He had 
brought an action for injuries caused by the negligence 
o~. the general contractor. An employee of the general 
contractor had placed a plank across a ditch that had 
been dug by a plumbing sub-contractor. The plank was 
placed in this position in order to assist the painters in the 
erection of staging for painting the houses being developed. 
The plank that was used was a bit narrower than those 
usually used for such a pupose; howeveT, the employee 
used this particular size of plank at the request of his em-
ployer, the general contractor. As the plank was placed 
by the employ-ee, one end led directly to a water faucet, 
which was the only source of water within the immediate 
vicinity. The staging was completed by the painters on 
F-riday, but the plank was left laying across the ditch and 
leading to the water faucet until the next Monday, when 
the accident occuiTed. The employee knew, and there-
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a position, would give those workmen who were in the area 
the impression that the plank was placed across the ditch 
to enable them to get from one side rto the other, particu-
larly when in need of water. The Plaintiff used the plank 
and it gave away, causing him to fall into the ditch and 
suffer severe injuries. The Trial Court held for the Plain-
tiff, and the Defendant appealed. 
On appeal, it was held that there was an implied in-
\'itation for workmen to use the plank to cross en. If the 
plank was placed as the Defendant says, to hold up stag-
ing, then after that purpose was fulfilled, the Defendant 
had a duty to remove the plank or warn invitees of the 
danger in using it for a cross walk. The Defendant had 
created this situation and, was, therefore, under a duty to 
warn workman. In this regard, the Court said: 
"Moreover, the invitor, under the law, is required to 
protect invitees, not only from dangers created by him 
or of which he has actual knowledge, but from those 
dangers which, by the use of reasonable care, he should 
have had knowledge. And lack of actual notice is no 
defense it' there was an opportunity to inspect and 
such inspection would have revealed the dangerous 
situation." (Emphasis added) 
Applying the facts of the Florez case to the present 
case, we respectfully submit that they are of real signifi-
cance to the present case. The Defendants, in construct-
ing this road had created an implied invitation to the 
Plaintiffs and other travelers upon 13th South to enter 
thereon and detour around the construction area. The 
road was placed at such a point that it gave a clear im-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
pression that its only purpose was one of detour for the 
traveling public. Under such circumstances, the Defend-
ants had a duty to warn the Plaintiffs and other travelers 
that it was not meant for that purpose and that entering 
thereon would subject the Plaintiffs or others to a danger~ 
ous situation. In not doing so, the Defendants were neg--
ligent. 
If we ·consider the Plaintiffs as licensees, the Defend-
ants still owe them a duty to refrain from leading them 
into hidden or dangerous traps, and to give timely warm-
ing of such peril. In oomenting on this duty, in Tempest 
v. Richardson, 5 Utah 2nd 17 4, 299 Pac. 2nd 124, this 
Court quoted with approval from the Restatement of the 
Law of Torts, Section 342, as follows: 
"Dangerous conditie\DS known to possessor. A posses-
sor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm caused · 
to gratuitous licensees by a natural or artificial con-
dition thereon, only if he 
(a) knows of the condition and realizes that it 
involved an unreasonable risk to them and had rea-
son to believe that they will not discover the condi-
tion or realize the risk, and 
(b) Invites or permits them to enter or remain 
upon the land without exercising reasonable (i) to 
make the condition reasonably safe, or (ii) to warn 
them of the condition and risk involved." 
In the present case, the Defendants clearly knew of 
the dangerous condition which existed by reason of the 
fact that the road was constructed where it was and that 
it involved an unreasonable risk to the traveling public in 
general and the Plaintiffs in particular, and they certainly 
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had reason to believe that Plaintiffs would not discover 
that condition or realize the risk involved therein. De-
fendants also, by implication, invited and permitted the 
Plaintiffs to enter and remain upon the land without exer-
cising reasonable care to make the conditions safe or to 
warn them of the condition and risk involved therein. Un-
der these circumstances, we respectfully submit that even 
considering the Plaintiffs as licensees, the Defendants weTe 
nevertheless under a duty to the Plaintiffs and were neg-
ligent in carrying out that duty as set forth above. As 
the Supreme Court of Oregon said in the case of McHenry 
v. Howell, 272 Pac. 2nd 210, in commenting upon the du-
ties owed to a licensee by an owner or occupant: 
"As to Plaintiff, Defendant was subject to the rule of 
law that liability of an owner or occupant of premises 
to a licensee may be predicated upon negligence in 
leaving something in the nature of a trap or pitfall at 
a place where his presence might have been antici-
pated without a warning thereon. A trap within the 
meaning of this rule is a danger which a person who 
does not know the premises could not avoid by reason-
able care or skill." (Emphasis added) 
We respectfully urge to the Court that under cither 
label, invitee or licensee, the Defendants had a duty to 
Plaintiffs insofar as construction of the road was concerned. 
That duty being one of refraining from leading Plaintiffs 
into hidden or dangerous traps and to give timely warning 
of such peril. and the finding of the lower court tha:t no 
duty did exist was in error. 
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POINT ll 
THE COURT ERREID IN GRANTING MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS THlERE WERE GEN-
UINE ISSUES OF FACT Will:CH EXISTED WITH RE-
SPECT TO DEFENDANTS' CONSTRUCT10N OF THE 
ROAD AND WITH RESPECT TO !DEFENDANTS' DU-
TIES UNDER DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE. 
As we indicated in our argument under Point I, the 
Defendants did have a duty to the Plaintiffs with respect 
to construction of the road. With this duty owing to the 
Plaintiffs, issues of fact were present in the case, which 
could not be decided by sumrnacy judgment of the Court. 
This is dearly the law of. this state as _evidenced by Rule 
56c of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedue, wherein it is said: 
"The judgment sought shall be rendered forthWitl( if 
the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file to-
gether with the affidavits, if ·any, show that there iS 
'no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled w a judgment as a matter of 
law." (Emphasis added) 
Under the wording of this rule, if it appears that there 
is any genuine issue, of a material fact, then a lower court 
cannot grant a summary judgment. See Young vs. Felor-
nia, 121 Utah 646, 244 Pac. 2nd 682; In re Williams 
Estate, 10 Utah 2nd, 83, 348 Pac. 2nd, 683; Grant vs. 
Springville Banking Company, 10 Utah 2nd 350, 353 Pac. 
2nd 460; and Bullock vs. Deseret Dodge Truck Center In-
corporated, 11 Utah 2nd, 1 354 Pac. 2nd, 559. 
The · JirSt · issue of fact present in the case was, of 
course, whether the Defendants were negligent in carry-
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lng out their responsibilities under the duty which they 
owed to the Plaintiffs in constiuction of the road. 
The record will disclose that the lower court in its 
pre-trial order found that the Plaintiff driver, William H. 
Steele, was negligent as a matter of law. This finding, how-
evt.'r, does not eliminate the second issue of fact present in 
the case. That issue of fact being whether the Defendants, 
under the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance had an oppor-
tunity to a void this accident after Plaintiff's negligence 
had begun. In either of the situations where this Court 
has said the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies, the 
Plaintiff, ·william H. Steele, should have had the oppor .. 
tunity to present his evidence as bearing upon the issue 
as follows: Whether the Plaintiff, William H. Steele had, 
by turning down this apparent detoor road placed himself 
in a position of inextri.ca:ble peril, or in the alternative, if 
he had placed himself in a position where he was merely 
inattentive to the surrounding circumstances, and in either 
event, if the Defendants or either of them had the last 
clear chance to avoid this accident. Under these circum-
stances, the court could not by merely finding the Plain-
tiff, William H. Steele, negligent as a matter of law, elim-
inate this subsidiary issue of fact from the case. There-
fore, we respectfully urge this Court that this is a genuine 
material issue of fact, and the summary judgment granted 
by the Court was in error. 
CaSes which have been decided by this Court ·and 
which set forth the law in this state with respect to the 
IX>ctrine of Last Clear Chance are as follows: Teakle vs. 
Railroad, 32 Utah 276, 90 Pac. 402; Knutson vs. Oregon 
Shor11ine Railroad Company, 78 Utah 145, 2 Pac. 2nd 102; 
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Compton vs. Ogden Union Railway and Depot Company, 
120 Utah 453, 235 Pac. 2nd 515; Graham vs. Johnson, 
109 Utah 346, 156 Pac. 2nd 230. 
Another Utah case which we submit is of particular 
significance as related to the position Plaintiffs found them-
selves in, is the Utah case of Lawrence vs. Hamburger Rail-
rood Company, 3 Utah 2nd 247, 282 Pac. 2nd 335. In this 
case this Court clearly sets forth the duties of a Defendant 
railroad company as encompassed by the Dostrine of Last 
Clear Chance as it applies to a Plaintiff who has negligently 
placed himself in a situation of peril. In this respect, the 
Court said: 
"The ·motorman or engineer operating a train may as-
sume and act in reliance on the assumption that a 
person on or approaching a crossing is in possession 
of his natural faculties and aware of the situation in-
cluding the fact that a train is a large and cumber-
some instrumentality which is difficult to stop and 
that the person will ~ercise ordinary care and take 
reasonable precaution for his own safety. If consi-
tent with his duty of due care, anything appears so 
that he either knows or should know that there is a 
likli:hood of danger to a person near the tracks, it be-
comes his duty to use all reasonable efforts to give 
warnings to slacken his speed and if possible to stop 
in time to avert an accident. The duty is measured 
by the exigencies of the occasion. For instance, dan-
ger would be more readily apprehended if the person 
on or near the tracks were a small child or sooneone 
possessing an obvious limitation or disability." (Em-
·phasis added) 
It is this latter statement by the Court which is of 
significance to the present situation. The Plaintiffs found 
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them:-;t'ives in a (X)Sition where it was not possible for them 
to observe the train as it moved south on the Defendants' 
railroad tracks. This was a clear and obvious limitation 
and disability with respect to their ability to avoid the 
accident, and therefore the duty owed by the Defendant 
railroad company or Defendant construction company was 
that much greater, as indicated by this Court in the Law-
rence case. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellants respectfully urge this Court to find 
that the granting of the summary judgment in favor of 
the Defendants was erroneous and without basis for the 
following reasons: 
1. The Defendants had a duty to the Plaintiffs in-
sofar as construction of the road was concerned. 
2. There was a genuine material issue of fact in the 
case with respect to the negligence of Defendants in per-
forming the duty owed to Plaintiffs in construction of the 
road. 
3. There was a genuine material issue of fact present 
in the case with respect to the duty of Defendants to Plain-
tiffs with respect to the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Jackson B. Howard and 
Jerry G. Thorn, for 
HOWARD AND LEWIS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff~ 
290 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 
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